php2shell-CVE-2026-109618-CVE-2026-109619-PoC README

项目的 README,来自 github.com/eness/php2shell-CVE-2026-109618-CVE-2026-109619-PoC。合并为一个 markdown 文件:README.md。

php2shell — CVE-2026-109618 / CVE-2026-109619

php2shell — CVE-2026-109618 / CVE-2026-109619

Critical Advisory (CVSS v4.0: 9.2 - Critical): On October 20, details of two pre-auth Remote Code Execution (RCE) flaws in the PHP core leaked online ahead of coordinated disclosure. Exploitation allows arbitrary command execution straight from the web server.


Table of Contents


Overview

php2shell refers to two critical vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-109618 & CVE-2026-109619) affecting core PHP functionality. The primary demonstrated vector is a heap use-after-free (UAF) in the PHP core session upload progress mechanism leading to arbitrary code execution (zend_call_function / system()).

Root Cause

PHP's upload progress handler (php_session_rfc1867_callback in ext/session/session.c) stores two raw zval * bucket pointers (post_bytes_processed and current_file_bytes_processed) directly in live HashTable structures.

During request processing:

  1. Trigger: A standard multipart POST request activates progress tracking with default configuration values (session.upload_progress.enabled = 1).
  2. Free: A progress update cycle re-reads session data. The function zend_hash_update() destroys the previous data tree using the destructor zval_ptr_dtor, freeing the memory block.
  3. Reclaim: The freed bucket memory is reclaimed. The dangling pointer is redirected to crafted zend_fcall_info and zend_internal_function structures.
  4. Execution: PHP calls zend_call_function(), resulting in arbitrary system command execution.

Verification & Targets


Affected PHP Versions

The following table summarizes the PHP versions affected by CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619, along with their support and patch statuses:

PHP Branch Status Affected Versions Fixed / Secure Version Notes
PHP 8.5 Supported (Active) < 8.5.12 8.5.12 Emergency security release published
PHP 8.4 Supported (Active) < 8.4.27 8.4.27 Emergency security release published
PHP 8.3 Supported (Active) < 8.3.36 8.3.36 Emergency security release published
PHP 8.2 Supported (Security Only) < 8.2.35 8.2.35 Emergency security release published
PHP 8.1 End of Life (EOL) All 8.1.x versions No Official Patch (EOL) Set session.upload_progress.enabled = Off or use ELS/distro backports
PHP 8.0 End of Life (EOL) All 8.0.x versions No Official Patch (EOL) Official support ended; configuration mitigation is mandatory
PHP 7.x End of Life (EOL) All 7.0 - 7.4 versions No Official Patch (EOL) Core ext/session logic vulnerable; urgent mitigation or upgrade required
PHP 5.x End of Life (EOL) 5.4.0+ (with RFC1867 progress tracking) No Official Patch (EOL) Official support ended; isolate host or disable upload progress

[!WARNING] PHP 8.1 and older End-of-Life (EOL) versions do not receive official security patches from the PHP Foundation. For these environments, immediately apply session.upload_progress.enabled = Off or rebuild PHP from source using the provided C source patch.


Threat Landscape & Detection Guidance

Exploitation of php2shell typically manifests as anomalous child processes spawned directly by PHP worker processes (php-fpm, php-cgi, php-cgi.exe, httpd, apache2).

Behavioral Indicators & Suspicious Child Processes

Monitor and alert on PHP worker processes executing:

Monitoring Recommendation

For Linux-based web environments without an endpoint detection agent, tools like Florian Roth's free process-watcher can be run in observe mode to flag unusual child process spawning in real time.


Action Items for Organizations

  1. Inventory All PHP Environments:
    • Public-facing web servers running applications like WordPress, Drupal, Joomla, or Magento.
    • Internal appliances, hosting panels (cPanel, Plesk), and bundled standalone binaries (php.exe, php-cgi.exe).
  2. Prepare for Patch Windows:
    • Official emergency patches from PHP and downstream Linux distributions are scheduled for release around Wednesday, October 21 at 14:00 UTC (10:00 AM ET).
    • Apply vendor updates immediately once released.
  3. Isolate End-of-Life (EOL) Installations:
    • Environments running unsupported versions (PHP 5.x, 7.x, 8.0, 8.1) may not receive official upstream backports.
    • Restrict access via VPN, apply strict WAF rules, or disable public internet exposure.
  4. Incident Response & Investigation:
    • If suspicious child processes or unexpected files are detected, isolate the host and preserve web server/PHP logs.
    • Inspect web roots and temporary directories (/tmp, /var/tmp) for dropped webshells or transient execution artifacts.

Proof of Concept (PoC)

A fully automated one-click remote exploit targeting CVE-2026-109618 is available in poc_109618.py. The exploit bypasses ASLR remotely using plain HTTP requests to achieve reliable arbitrary command execution.

Exploit Architecture & Stages

The attack chain consists of four sequential stages over HTTP:

  1. Stage 0 — HTTP Worker Rotation: Aborts the current prefork worker over HTTP to ensure a clean heap state in the newly spawned worker child.
  2. Stage 1 — Heap Base Leak: Induces an out-of-memory (OOM) condition via an oversized multipart field (--huge-mb, default 12MB) to trigger uninitialized memory leakage through Set-Cookie: PHPSESSID, extracting the Zend MM 2MB-aligned chunk base.
  3. Stage 2 — Libphp Base Leak: Exploits session serialization / HashTable allocation alignment to leak the ZVAL_PTR_DTOR function pointer via Set-Cookie, computing the base address of libphp.so.
  4. Stage 3 — Fake Reference & Arbitrary Execution: Forges a fake HashTable structure embedded inside a 167-byte zend_string with pDestructor pointed directly to zif_system in libphp.so. The crafted reference overwrites PS(http_session_vars). When PHP frees the session data, zif_system executes the supplied command.

[!NOTE] The command is embedded directly inside a 167-byte live zend_string carrier (0x98 header + NUL byte limit), restricting inline command strings to maximum 14 bytes (MAX_CMD = 14). For longer commands, chain through a short trigger such as sh</tmp/c (8 bytes) or sh</out/c.

Target Requirements

The default exploit profile targets mod_php under Apache prefork with the following settings:

Usage & Parameters

Basic Execution
# Default command execution against target URL
python3 poc_109618.py -u http://127.0.0.1:8088/index.php

# Execute a custom command (max 14 bytes) and verify via local proof file
python3 poc_109618.py -u http://127.0.0.1:8088/index.php -c 'id>/out/p1' --proof-file out/p1

# Execute command writing to webroot and verify via HTTP GET fetch
python3 poc_109618.py -u http://127.0.0.1:8088/index.php -c 'id>p1.txt' --fetch /p1.txt
Command-Line Options
Option Description Default
-u, --url (Required) Target PHP endpoint URL None
-c, --cmd Command to execute (maximum 14 bytes) id>/out/p1
--proof-file Path to local proof file to check post-exploitation; '' disables out/p1
--fetch Relative HTTP path to GET after exploitation (e.g. if writing to webroot) ""
--profile Target build profile: bookworm (official php:8.4.26-apache) or lab (Apache 2.4.68) bookworm
--zif-offset Offset of zif_system in libphp.so (hex format e.g. 0x43a870) Loaded from offsets file
--dtor-offset Offset of ZVAL_PTR_DTOR in libphp.so (hex format e.g. 0x613c50) Loaded from offsets file
--htdata-offset Chunk-relative offset of the 167-byte live string carrier Profile dependent (0x690d8 or 0x6e0d8)
--offsets-file Path to load/store derived libphp offsets out/offsets.env
--docker-container Docker container name to automatically derive offsets on localhost php2shell-target
--no-auto-offsets Disable automatic offset extraction via Docker helper False
--huge-mb Size in MB of the OOM payload; must exceed target memory_limit 12
--timeout Per-request network socket timeout in seconds 30.0
--retries Number of attempts per leak stage (stage 3 runs retries + 2) 3
--no-pre-rotate Skip the initial worker rotation (Stage 0) False
--no-retry-rotate Do not rotate workers between failed stage attempts False
-q, --quiet Suppress verbose output logging False

Profiles & Offsets

The exploit script supports profile-based presets:

When targeting local Docker containers (127.0.0.1 / localhost), the script can automatically extract binary symbol offsets directly from the running container using docker/offsets.py and cache them in out/offsets.env. For remote targets where binary layout differs from Debian 12, provide --zif-offset and --dtor-offset manually.


Mitigation & Source Patching

Until official vendor packages are updated in your repositories, you can protect your environments using configuration changes, automated scripts, or by compiling PHP with the included source patch.

1. Configuration Mitigation (Immediate Stopgap)

The vulnerability relies on PHP's session upload progress mechanism (session.upload_progress.enabled), which is enabled by default. Disabling this directive neutralizes the attack vector while preserving regular file upload functionality:

In your php.ini:

session.upload_progress.enabled = Off

Or for PHP-FPM pool configurations (e.g., /etc/php/*/fpm/pool.d/www.conf):

php_admin_flag[session.upload_progress.enabled] = off

After modifying the configuration, reload/restart your web services (e.g. systemctl reload php-fpm or systemctl reload apache2).

2. Automated Quick-Fix Script

A mitigation helper script is available under the quick-fix/ directory:

3. Source Code Patch (session-upload-progress-counters.patch)

If you build PHP from source or maintain custom distribution packages, a C-level source patch is provided under patch/session-upload-progress-counters.patch.

What the patch fixes: The patch resolves the root cause in ext/session/session.c and ext/session/php_session.h. Instead of maintaining vulnerable, raw zval * bucket pointers (post_bytes_processed and current_file_bytes_processed) into dynamic HashTable structures (which become dangling pointers when the hash table is cleared or re-allocated during upload progress updates), the patch:

How to Apply the Patch:

  1. Navigate to the root of your php-src source directory:

    cd /path/to/php-src
    
  2. Test applying the patch (dry-run):

    # Using git (if building from a git clone)
    git apply --check /path/to/patch/session-upload-progress-counters.patch
    
    # OR using GNU patch
    patch -p1 --dry-run < /path/to/patch/session-upload-progress-counters.patch
    
  3. Apply the patch:

    # Using git
    git apply /path/to/patch/session-upload-progress-counters.patch
    
    # OR using GNU patch
    patch -p1 < /path/to/patch/session-upload-progress-counters.patch
    
  4. Recompile and install PHP:

    ./buildconf --force   # if needed
    ./configure <your-options>
    make -j"$(nproc)"
    sudo make install
    
  5. Restart your PHP runtime / web services:

    sudo systemctl restart php-fpm
    # or
    sudo systemctl restart apache2
    
Community Backports for EOL Versions (PHP 5.6, 7.4, 8.0, 8.1)

For legacy systems that cannot immediately upgrade to supported PHP 8.2+ releases (e.g. legacy OpenCart, WordPress, or control panels running on PHP 5.6, 7.4, 8.0, or 8.1), dedicated backports combining the official PHP Group OOM fix with the root-cause counter sync are available:

4. Cloudflare WAF Custom Rules

Recommended Cloudflare WAF rule templates to filter malicious traffic are located in the cloudflare-rule-fix/ directory:

5. FrankenPHP Caddyfile Configuration

To disable the session upload progress mechanism globally in FrankenPHP environments, a Caddyfile snippet is provided.

Add the contents of frankenphp/Caddyfile-snippet to your global Caddyfile block:

{
    frankenphp {
        php_ini session.upload_progress.enabled 0
    }
}

6. Lighttpd Configuration

For environments running Lighttpd, you can block multipart requests (POST, PUT, PATCH) on virtual hosts or directories that do not accept file uploads using lighttpd/php2shell.conf:

$HTTP["request-method"] =~ "^(POST|PUT|PATCH)$" {
    $REQUEST_HEADER["Content-Type"] =~ "(?i)^\s*multipart/form-data([;,[:space:]]|$)" {
        url.access-deny = ( "" )
    }
}

7. Apache Mitigation (ModSecurity & .htaccess)

Two mitigation options are provided for Apache environments:


Disclaimer

This project is intended strictly for educational purposes and authorized security research. Use only in environments you own or have explicit permission to test.


Author & Contact

php2shell-CVE-2026-109618-CVE-2026-109619-PoC (eness/php2shell-CVE-2026-109618-CVE-2026-109619-PoC)

正在搜索数据库…

这是什么?本仓库记录了 PHP 中两个严重的认证前远程代码执行漏洞(CVE-2026-109618 和 CVE-2026-109619),并提供了缓解脚本、WAF 规则和源代码补丁;可用的概念验证(PoC)利用程序仍在开发中。
这里面有实际的利用代码,还是只有安全公告?目前主要是安全公告加上缓解工具(配置修改、快速修复 shell 脚本、C 语言补丁,以及 WAF/Apache/Lighttpd 规则),并不是可以直接运行的利用程序。
我现在该如何保护服务器免受此漏洞影响?在 php.ini 或 PHP-FPM 进程池配置中禁用 session.uploadprogress.enabled,然后重新加载 php-fpm/apache2;或者运行 quick-fix/ 目录下的辅助脚本,自动检查并应用缓解措施。
修复这个问题需要 PHP 源代码吗?只有在需要永久修复时才需要:应用 patch/session-upload-progress-counters.patch 需要你准备 php-src 源代码树,以便打补丁并重新编译 PHP。
我能从这个仓库下载并运行利用程序吗?暂时不能——作者表示 PoC 仍在开发和测试中,并将“很快”发布;目前只提供安全公告和缓解措施。
哪些 PHP 版本受影响?有报告显示 PHP 5、6、7 和 8 都可能受影响,但官方补丁主要计划针对目前仍受支持的 PHP 8.x 分支;已停止维护(EOL)的版本如 5.x、7.x、8.0 和 8.1 将不会有厂商修复。
这个漏洞的根本原因是什么?这是 PHP 会话上传进度处理函数(php_session_rfc1867_callback)中的堆上释放后使用(use-after-free)问题:已释放的 zval 桶指针被重新分配并被重定向,从而触发 zend_call_function(),最终导致任意命令执行。
我怎样判断服务器上是否有人在利用此漏洞?留意 PHP 工作进程(php-fpm、apache2)是否派生出异常的子进程,例如 /bin/sh、cmd.exe、curl、wget、nc,或 whoami/id/uname -a 之类的信息收集命令;process-watcher 等工具可以实时标记此类行为。
有没有可以立即部署的 WAF 规则?有。cloudflare-rule-fix/ 目录中提供了 Cloudflare WAF 规则模板,可拦截恶意的 multipart 流量;同时也包含了适用于 Apache 的 ModSecurity 和 .htaccess 规则。
作者
eness
大小
0.2 MB
星标
1.1K
更新
提交Oct 22
时长
28天
提交 · 90 天