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README проекта с github.com/interplains/Zero-Breach-Toolkit. Одним файлом markdown: README.md.
Version 3 is out: besides looking for known spyware, it now shows the ways in left open on your devices, checks the links, emails, files and QR codes people send you, and walks you through your accounts and home network. A double-click app for Windows, Mac and Linux, in 27 languages. Download it from the latest release.
Your antivirus may delete the program without asking. Microsoft Defender and other antivirus products sometimes wrongly remove new programs that are not code-signed yet. If the download vanishes, will not open, or you see "Threat found", it is a false alarm when the file came from the official release page. See If your antivirus removes it for safe ways round it. Checking a phone? The browser check needs no download at all.
A free, open-source check for traces of known mercenary spyware (Pegasus, Predator, Graphite, Candiru and others) on computers, Android phones and iPhone backups.
Made by archivegenocide. Built on Zero Breach.
If you think you are being targeted right now, get expert help first. You do not need to run this tool before asking. Journalists, activists, human-rights defenders and civil society can contact the Access Now Digital Security Helpline (free, 24/7, many languages) or Amnesty International's Security Lab.
To check an iPhone backup or an Android collection there is nothing to install: open
archivegenocide.com/scan/phone on the computer that holds
the backup, choose the backup folder, and you get the same result as the program, in your language.
Nothing is uploaded. The check runs inside a part of the page whose security settings forbid every
network connection, and before it opens your backup it proves this by trying to reach the site and
showing you that your browser blocked it. The page's code is in web/phone/.
A web page cannot look at the computer itself (its programs, start-up items and connections). To check a computer, use the program below.
You do not need to know anything technical to use this. Download one file from the latest release, open it, and follow the window. You do not need the source code on this page, and you do not need to type any commands.
Once it is open: choose a check, press Start check, and read the result. It tells you in plain words whether anything was found and what to do next. You can save the report if you want to keep it or show it to someone helping you.
Which check? Use Standard unless you have a reason not to: it covers browsers, apps, startup items, program files and out-of-date programs (usually 15 to 20 minutes). Quick looks at browsers only (5 to 10 minutes). Full adds web caches and more file types (30 minutes or more). You can press Stop at any time and keep what has been checked so far. To check a phone, choose A phone in the window; the guides there explain what you need first.
A green result is good news, not a guarantee. It means this check found none of the published traces it looks for, in the places it could read. It cannot find spyware nobody has published traces of, and it does not prove a device is safe. If you think you are being targeted, ask a digital-security helpline even if the result is green.
Your antivirus may flag or delete these programs. It is a false alarm if the file came from the official release page; see If your antivirus removes it. If the file came from anywhere else, do not run it and trust the warning.
zero-breach-toolkit-windows-x64.exe.zero-breach-toolkit-macos-apple-silicon.dmg for a newer Mac (M1, M2, M3, M4),
or zero-breach-toolkit-macos-intel.dmg for an older Intel Mac. The Apple menu →
About This Mac says which one you have.Open the app on the Mac itself, not through a remote or SSH session: it needs a desktop.
zero-breach-toolkit-linux-x64.tar.gz.tar -xzf zero-breach-toolkit-linux-x64.tar.gz)../zero-breach-toolkit, or right-click it and choose Run in Terminal.The warnings appear because the programs are not signed by Microsoft or Apple yet. Each
program is built by GitHub from the published source, and you can check that before running it:
gh attestation verify <file> --repo interplains/Zero-Breach-Toolkit (see
docs/VERIFYING.md). Prefer to see exactly what runs? Use the Python
version in the guide below; it is the same check.
To let the check read Safari on a Mac, give Zero Breach Toolkit (or Terminal, for the Python version) Full Disk Access in System Settings → Privacy & Security.
New programs that are not code-signed yet are often flagged by mistake, and some antivirus products delete them straight away without asking. If you downloaded the program from the official release page, it is a false alarm: the code is public and each program has a public build record. We report these false alarms to the antivirus companies, and code signing, which should stop most of them, is on its way.
First, make sure it is the real file. Only restore a file you downloaded yourself from the official release page. To be sure, compare its fingerprint with the one published there: open PowerShell and run
Get-FileHash "$HOME\Downloads\zero-breach-toolkit-windows-x64.exe"
and check that the long number matches the line for that file in SHA256SUMS-programs.txt on the release
page (capital letters do not matter). If the file came from anywhere else, or the numbers differ, delete it
and trust the warning.
Then choose one way round it:
zero-breach-toolkit, then Actions → Restore
(or Allow on device), and open the program again. If there is no entry, download the file again
and it will appear when the file is removed. Other antivirus products keep removed files under
Quarantine: restore the file there, or add an exception for that one file..exe
for antivirus to object to. Follow the step-by-step guide.Do not turn your antivirus off to run the program: restoring the one file is enough. If Microsoft Defender removed it, you can help get the flag lifted by reporting the file as a false alarm at microsoft.com/wdsi/filesubmission.
You do not need a GitHub account or any technical knowledge. You need a Windows or Mac computer and about 20 minutes. Phones are checked by connecting them to the computer. If your antivirus removes a file from the download, see If your antivirus removes it.
What do you want to check? This Windows computer · This Mac · An Android phone · An iPhone
Set up (only the first time)
Run the check
y and press Enter. When it finishes, press Enter.Set up (only the first time)
Run the check
Terminal, press Enter). Copy this line, paste it
into Terminal and press Enter:cd ~/Downloads/Zero-Breach-Toolkit-main && python3 -X utf8 scan/zero-breach-toolkit.py
After step 1, python3 is the Python from python.org. If you skipped step 1, python3 is
the one Apple ships with the Command Line Tools: it still runs the check in the terminal, but
on some macOS versions its window cannot open (it says so, and carries on in the terminal).
For the window, finish step 1 or use the downloadable Mac app.y and press Enter. When it finishes, press Enter.3 and press Enter, then type . (a full stop) and
press Enter. It is saved in the Zero-Breach-Toolkit-main folder with the date and time in
its name, so every check gets its own file. Type 0 to finish.Set up (only the first time)
python3 --version. If it is missing, install it with your
package manager, for example sudo dnf install python3 (Fedora),
sudo apt install python3 (Ubuntu, Debian, Mint) or sudo pacman -S python (Arch).If Chinese, Japanese or Korean text in the window shows as empty boxes, install a CJK font
(for example sudo apt install fonts-noto-cjk) and open the program again.
Run the check
cd ~/Downloads/Zero-Breach-Toolkit-main && python3 -X utf8 scan/zero-breach-toolkit.py
y and press Enter. When it finishes, press Enter.3 and press Enter, then type . (a full stop) and
press Enter. It is saved in the Zero-Breach-Toolkit-main folder with the date and time in
its name, so every check gets its own file. Type 0 to finish.You do not need sudo to run the check. It reads your own account's records; if you run with
sudo, it may look at the root account's browsers instead of yours.
Cannot turn on USB debugging, or install anything? Use a bug report the phone makes itself. Turn on
Developer options (Settings → About phone → tap Build number seven times), then Settings → System →
Developer options → Take bug report ("Full report" if it asks). When the notification says it is ready,
tap it and choose Share > save to the phone's Files (Android keeps bug reports where a cable cannot
reach), then copy the .zip to your computer the way you copy photos (a USB cable with the phone set to "File
transfer", which is not USB debugging, or a memory card). If your accounts may be watched, do not email it to yourself
or use a cloud folder: it holds private details about the phone. Check it as it is, without unzipping it:
in the window, A phone → What
is it? → Android bug report, or --phone "the-bug-report.zip". A bug report holds the phone's system
state, settings, logs and the history of apps installed and removed, but not the apps' files, the
file list or text messages, so those parts are listed as not checked. For the fullest check, use the
cable steps below.
First do the Set up steps for Windows or Mac above.
On the phone
On the computer
Start Zero Breach (Windows: double-click run-scan.cmd; Mac: step 5 of the Mac guide).
In the menu, type the number next to A phone and press Enter, then type 2 (Collect
from an Android phone connected by USB now) and press Enter.
Press Enter to save the collection on your Desktop, then type YES and press Enter.
The collector asks a few questions. Use the arrow keys and Enter to answer:
| It asks | Choose |
|---|---|
| Backup | Only SMS |
| Download copies of apps | Only non-system packages |
| Remove copies of apps signed with a trusted certificate | No |
| Intrusion Logs | No |
| Hash files | No |
| Anything else | No |
If the phone shows Back up my data, tap it (leave the password empty). Keep the phone unlocked until the collection finishes.
The check starts by itself and shows the result.
When you are done, turn USB debugging off again on the phone.
First do the Set up steps for Windows or Mac above.
These steps work the same way for an iPad. The check runs on a computer, not on the iPhone or iPad itself: iOS and iPadOS do not let any app read other apps' data, so the device is backed up to a computer and the backup is checked there.
Make a backup on the computer. Connect the iPhone with a cable and tap Trust on the phone.
Choose Back up all of the data on your iPhone to this computer, tick Encrypt local backup, choose a password you will remember, and click Back Up Now. Wait until it finishes.
Open the backup folder:
%USERPROFILE%\Apple\MobileSync\Backup and press
Enter.~/Library/Application Support/MobileSync/Backup and press Enter.Inside is a folder with a long name of letters and numbers: that is your backup.
Start Zero Breach. In the menu, type the number next to A phone, press Enter, type 1
and press Enter.
Drag the backup folder (the one with the long name) into the Zero Breach window and press Enter.
When asked whether the backup is password-protected, type y and press Enter, then type the
backup password (nothing appears while you type) and press Enter.
| What you see | What to do |
|---|---|
| The program disappears after downloading, or Windows Security says "Threat found" | A false alarm if it came from the official release page. See If your antivirus removes it. |
'python' is not recognized or nothing happens on Windows |
Run the Python installer again, choose Modify, and make sure Add Python to environment variables is ticked. Restart the computer. |
No such file or directory on a Mac |
Type python3 -X utf8 (with a space at the end) in Terminal, then drag the file zero-breach-toolkit.py from the toolkit's scan folder into Terminal and press Enter. This works from any folder. |
Bad CPU type in executable, or trying to run it on an iPad or iPhone |
The check cannot run on an iPad or iPhone. Back the device up to a Windows PC or Mac (the iPhone steps above work for an iPad too) and check the backup on that computer. |
A folder named candiru in the download |
That is part of the toolkit: third_party/candiru holds the published detection rules for Candiru's spyware, not the spyware. Leave it in place; if it was deleted, download the toolkit again. |
| "encrypted iPhone backups require optional cryptography" after installing it | It went into a different Python. Install it with the same command you start the check with (python3 -m pip install --require-hashes -r requirements-backups.txt on a Mac), from the toolkit folder. |
command not found: python3 |
Install Python from python.org (step 1), then close and reopen Terminal. |
| A match inside an ad blocker such as uBlock Origin | Fixed in 0.1.15: ad-blocker filter lists contain these domains in order to block them, so a match in the browser's copy of a list is now a note, not a finding. Update to the latest download. |
CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED on Windows (updating the lists or collecting from an Android phone) |
Open PowerShell and run Invoke-WebRequest https://github.com -UseBasicParsing | Out-Null, then try again: Windows downloads some certificates only when first needed. If it still fails, pause your antivirus's HTTPS scanning ("web shield") for a moment. |
Updating the indicator lists fails on a Mac (CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED) |
Open Finder → Applications → Python 3 and double-click Install Certificates.command, then update again. Full Disk Access does not affect updating. |
| Android: the collector finds no phone | Unlock the phone, use a different cable or USB port, and check Allow USB debugging was accepted. Unplug and plug in again. |
| iPhone: "wrong password" | Use the password chosen when Encrypt local backup was first turned on. If it is forgotten, it can be reset on the iPhone (Settings → General → Transfer or Reset iPhone → Reset → Reset All Settings), then make a new backup. |
| Safari "could not be checked" on a Mac | Give Terminal Full Disk Access (Mac step 3), close Terminal, open it again and run the check again. |
Still stuck? Ask in the issues (do not post your report there; it contains private details).
No administrator rights are needed.
| Where | What it looks for |
|---|---|
| Browsers at their default locations: Chrome, Edge and Brave (including beta, dev, canary and nightly channels), Chromium, Vivaldi, Opera, Opera GX, Arc, Yandex; Firefox, LibreWolf, Waterfox, Floorp, Zen, Pale Moon, Tor Browser | indicator addresses in history, cookies, connection records, HSTS, bookmarks, downloads, site storage and caches, per profile |
| Desktop apps with a built-in Chromium browser | supported history, cookie and storage records; raw app web caches are skipped and reported as a gap |
| Downloaded files | the website each file came from (the "Mark of the Web" stamp) |
| The Win+R box | commands people were tricked into pasting by fake "verify you are human" pages |
| Antivirus status and Microsoft Defender history | registered antivirus products and their reported status; past Defender detections, protection-off events and added exclusions |
| PowerShell log | scripts that named a spyware address, or downloaded and ran code |
| Programs listed by Windows | existing files named in the shim cache and the Windows 11 launch list, compared with published sample fingerprints; not a complete execution history |
| Prefetch and Amcache | supported Prefetch executable-name records and Amcache file inventory; the program files they name are never opened |
| Selected user folders | fingerprints of candidate files, within size and directory limits |
| DNS cache, DNS history, hosts file, COM and startup/task/service registrations | known indicators in supported network and persistence records; not a full persistence audit |
A Prefetch match (execution-record) does not identify the file's contents or full path;
an Amcache match (inventory-record) does not prove execution or that the file still
exists. Locked or unsupported records are gaps.
Antivirus status comes from Windows Security Center, including third-party products such as Bitdefender that register there. An active registered product puts an old Defender-off event in context; it does not mean protection is off now. Registration is not a health test; some enterprise products do not register, and unavailable status is a gap. A desktop app such as Slack is listed because its web records were checked, not because it is suspicious.
The default hash check covers .dll, .exe, .sys, .ocx, .cpl, .scr, .tmp,
.dat, .bin and .ax files up to 512 MiB in selected folders, skipping cache and
dependency directories. Computer checks can find published infrastructure or file traces;
they cannot tell whether a phone is infected.
The same browsers are checked at their default locations, plus common Snap and Flatpak
packages and Firefox's newer ~/.config/mozilla profile folder on Linux. On a Linux desktop
in another language, the translated Downloads, Desktop and Documents folders are found from
user-dirs.dirs. File fingerprints, separate browser cache locations and bounded saved-record
checks run without administrator access.
.desktop entries, systemd units
and immediate .conf overrides, cron configuration and scheduled script directories; on
macOS, standard LaunchAgent and LaunchDaemon property lists. A launch item's program is
compared as an executable path and, by its file name, as a process name.~/.zsh_sessions), the hosts file and
readable current text system logs. Paths inside $( ) and backticks are recognised. Large
history and log files are limited to recent records; the omitted part is a gap.These read saved configuration, not which jobs are enabled or ran. Network strings are references; exact known executable paths in supported launch configuration can be findings, with activation and execution unverified.
File checks also cover extensionless files, executables, native libraries and scripts in selected application, user and temporary folders (512 MiB limit). Windows-only live checks do not run here; copied Prefetch and Amcache files can still be selected in targeted mode, though compressed Prefetch needs Windows.
Prevention rather than detection: the check compares the versions of common programs (Chrome, Firefox, Thunderbird, Adobe Acrobat and Reader, WinRAR, 7-Zip, Notepad++, Java, Office, Edge, Windows itself, macOS and Safari) with CISA's list of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities, the flaws attackers are using right now. A program is called out of date only when the official CVE record gives a fixed version and the installed one is older; otherwise you get plain update advice. The lists are downloaded by the indicator update; the comparison happens offline and your list of programs never leaves the computer. An out-of-date program is not a sign of spyware, but it is a common way in.
Apple fixes a flaw separately in each supported release line (for example iOS 18.7.3 and 26.2). Each installed version is compared with the fix for its own line; a version on a line the record does not list is not called out of date. The same list is used for an iPhone backup: the check says when the iOS version the backup records is older than such a fix.
Also prevention: the check reads the computer's saved Wi-Fi settings and points out the ones that weaken it: open networks it joins by itself (anyone nearby can copy the name), WEP, the original WPA or its TKIP cipher, and hidden networks it keeps calling out for. On Windows the saved networks are exported without their passwords into a private temporary folder, three settings are read from each, and the files are deleted. On Linux NetworkManager is asked only for each network's security type; on macOS only the network in use is checked (the saved list needs administrator rights). No network is joined, scanned or contacted, no password is read, and the router's own settings are not checked, because that would mean contacting it.
It also warns when a network nearby (in the computer's last Wi-Fi scan; no scan is started) uses the name of one you saved but has no password or uses WEP: the classic "evil twin" set up to watch people's traffic.
A trusted root certificate lets whoever holds its key read this computer's encrypted web traffic. The check compares the trusted roots with the ones the major trust programs distribute (Microsoft and Mozilla, from the public CCADB lists) and names the others by kind: security software that checks encrypted pages, developer tools such as Fiddler or mitmproxy, VPN apps, game launchers, or unknown. On macOS it lists certificates given custom trust; on Linux the locally added anchors. It also reports a system proxy or automatic proxy script, DNS servers set by hand or in ranges used by DNS-hijacking malware, and another address on the network claiming the router's hardware address (a sign of ARP spoofing). All local reads; each is "worth a look" with its usual explanation.
--dns-log FILE checks a DNS log instead of this computer: from a router (dnsmasq), Pi-hole (its
text log or its database), AdGuard Home (querylog.json), BIND, Unbound, a Windows DNS server's
debug log or Zeek. Every name any device looked up, and every address in a logged answer, is
compared with the indicators offline, so phones, tablets and TVs on the network are covered without
touching them. A lookup the filter blocked is reported as an attempt, with the device's address.
It sees only the period the log covers, and not devices that use their own DNS (browsers with DNS
over HTTPS, VPNs, mobile data).
Besides looking for traces of spyware, every check lists the doors left open: settings and programs that make spying easier if someone gets the chance. Each comes with why it matters and how to close it, and in the window an Open this setting button takes you straight to the right page, with Check again to confirm. They are prevention advice, never findings, and never change the result.
s***@gmail.com) under
WORTH A LOOK: a browser syncing to someone else's account sends them your history and saved passwords.--home-network is not part of the spyware check: it is the one part of the toolkit that talks to
other devices, so it explains what it will do and asks each time. On the local network this
computer is on (private addresses only, the 256 addresses around it) it finds the devices and their
names (Bonjour/mDNS and UPnP), tries to open a connection to a short list of ports on each and
closes it at once, and reads the router's UPnP description and its list of ports opened to the
internet. It reports risky doors - Android debugging left open on a TV or phone, Telnet, camera
recorders, remote desktop and VNC - cameras on the network, and ports your router has opened. It
never logs in, tries a password or changes anything. Only run it on a network you own or are
responsible for.
It also tests whether the router's lookups are being changed - the classic sign of a router whose DNS
setting was altered by someone or by malware - without logging into it. It asks the router to look up
one.one.one.one and dns.google (whose answers never change), a made-up name under example.com
(which must not exist), and two names that echo back the address of the resolver the router really
uses. A wrong answer, a made-up name that comes back with an address (often an internet provider's
advert page, sometimes a hijack), or a resolver in a range used by the DNSChanger malware is reported
with what to do. These five lookups are the only part of the check whose questions leave your network
(through the router, like any lookup); the consent screen names them and --no-router-lookups skips
them. If the router does not answer - a VPN usually blocks this on purpose - that is reported as not
checked.
Android TV and Google TV can be checked for spyware like a phone: see docs/ANDROID-TV.md.
Got a text, a WhatsApp or Signal message, or an email with a link you are not sure about? Paste it into "More checks" > "Check a link or message" in the window, or choose "A link or message" in the start menu, or run:
zero-breach-toolkit --check-link "the message or link"
zero-breach-toolkit --check-message saved-message.txt (use - to paste instead)
Nothing is opened, looked up or sent anywhere: the text is only compared. Every link in it (including "defanged" ones like hxxps://example[.]com) is checked against the spyware indicators the scan uses, and against tricks from documented attacks on journalists and activists:
sgnl://linkdevice) and fake Signal sites, used to read people's messages;The result is one of four: known spyware infrastructure, dangerous, worth a look, or nothing known, with what to do next. Dangerous links are shown "defanged" so they cannot be clicked by accident. "Nothing known" does not prove a link is safe: targeted attacks use new addresses.
A different question from "is there spyware on my phone". When a phone is taken at a border, a police station or a checkpoint, what usually happens is not spyware: it is plugged into a machine that copies everything off it.
zero-breach-toolkit --was-extracted phone-collection/
Finding nothing here is not proof, and the report says so every time: a successful extraction can leave no trace at all. If a phone was out of your hands and unlocked, treat what was on it as known to whoever had it.
What it reads, from a phone collection or an iPhone backup you already have:
Each sign says what it does and does not prove - USB debugging is listed as "worth knowing", because developers turn it on too - and being copied is told apart from being infected: a tool that copies a phone usually leaves nothing running on it.
Targeted spyware usually arrives as a message, and the giveaways are in the parts an email program hides. Save
the message ("Show original" in Gmail, "View message source" in Outlook, or the .eml file - forwarding it to
yourself does not work, it loses those parts) and check it:
zero-breach-toolkit --check-email message.eml
It reads who really sent it (the envelope sender is often not the "From:" you see), what the receiving server decided about it - SPF, DKIM and DMARC, the one part of an email a sender cannot forge - whether a reply would go somewhere else, display names that imitate a company while the address does not, every link (through the same check as "Check a link or message"), and every attachment: programs dressed as documents, names with a hidden character that reverses how they read, old Office formats that can carry macros, archives that hide what is inside. It also says when a message is pushing you to act quickly, and about what.
A message that passes every check can still be a lie told from a real account someone else has taken over, so the report ends by saying what to do rather than declaring it safe.
A QR code is a link you cannot read before you follow it. The dangerous ones are printed on stickers over real ones, or sent as a picture "to sign in" - and the worst of them link your messaging account to someone else's device, so every message you get afterwards is theirs too.
zero-breach-toolkit --check-qr screenshot.png
The code is read from a picture on your computer - no camera, nothing opened, nothing contacted - and then checked exactly like a pasted link, so device-linking addresses, look-alike names and known spyware links are all recognised. The reader is written into the toolkit (PNG, GIF, BMP and PPM, no other software needed): it handles codes that are turned, mirrored, only a pixel or two per square, and damaged - and when a code is too damaged to repair it says so rather than guessing at the text.
For a file you do not trust - an attachment, a download, an app someone sent you - before you open it or hand it to an expert. Drop it onto the program, or:
zero-breach-toolkit --check-file invoice.pdf
The file is read, never run, opened in another program, uploaded or moved (where it was found is evidence). It tells you, answer first:
invoice.pdf.exe),
invisible right-to-left characters that make fdp.exe display as exe.pdf, or the real ending pushed out of
sight by spaces;.lnk): what they really start, and whether that is a command tool with an internet address,
a hidden window or an encoded command;"Save a sealed copy" writes it into a ZIP protected with the password infected - the usual way to pass a sample to
a researcher, so the copy cannot be run or removed by accident on the way.
"A file's fingerprint" (start menu, "More checks", or zero-breach-toolkit --hash-lookup FILE_OR_FOLDER)
fingerprints files and tells you who knows them:
--online or say yes: the fingerprints - never the files, their names or paths - of
programs, scripts, documents and archives that are not validly signed are sent to the services you choose:
CIRCL hashlookup (Luxembourg, no key: is it ordinary known software?), MalwareBazaar and ThreatFox (abuse.ch,
Switzerland), VirusTotal (Google, USA) and Hybrid Analysis (CrowdStrike, USA), the last three with your own
free key (saved with --set-lookup-key or "Keys for online look-ups"; never on the command line). Answers are
cached on this computer. VirusTotal's free key allows 4 look-ups a minute, so 20 files per run unless you add
--lookup-all.Results say plainly: known malicious (with family and first seen), flagged by some tools, known good, or unknown - which is not the same as safe.
zero-breach-toolkit --hash-lookup Downloads/invoice.exe --online circl,malwarebazaar
The scan's "Doors to close" tells you what is open. This closes the ones it is safe for a tool to close, and explains the rest:
zero-breach-toolkit --fix-it lists what can be done; changes nothing
zero-breach-toolkit --fix-it windows:firewall does that one, after asking
zero-breach-toolkit --undo-fix 20261110T... puts a setting back
It can switch Remote Desktop off, stop automatic sign-in, switch the firewall on and remove old file sharing (SMB1). The rules it follows:
sudo command is printed for you
to run.Windows keeps a record of a great deal that happens on it. "Windows' own records" (start menu "Look closer",
"More checks", or zero-breach-toolkit --hunt-windows) reads those records and looks for the handful of things
that mean someone else had control:
Every finding says what the record was, what it means, and what is normal - because most of these have
innocent explanations, and the report is written so a person can judge their own case. Routine noise (Windows
Update downloads, driver signature messages) is kept back as context unless you add --hunt-all. The Security
log needs administrator rights: without them the check says so rather than staying quiet (--with-security).
A helper can read logs from someone else's computer on any operating system, because the toolkit has its own reader for Windows log files:
wevtutil epl "Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational" ps.evtx (on the Windows computer)
zero-breach-toolkit --hunt-windows ps.evtx (on any computer)
That reader was checked record for record against Windows' own output: 21,712 records across four logs, with every event number, timestamp and field identical.
No program can see inside your accounts without signing in, and this toolkit never signs in to anything. But a
computer still linked to your WhatsApp, a forwarding rule in your email or a location shared from a family app is
a more common way to be watched than spyware. More checks → Check my online accounts (or
zero-breach-toolkit --accounts) walks you through twelve places to look: the devices on your Apple, Google and
Microsoft accounts, Apple's Safety Check, linked devices in WhatsApp, Signal and Telegram, where your Instagram
and Facebook are logged in, email forwarding and rules, location sharing and a lock on your phone number. For
each one you answer checked, fine, something is wrong or missing or skip. The result says what to do about each
thing you found, warns that removing someone's access can alert them, and lists every skipped step as not
checked, never as fine. You can save it.
It starts with the single best thing you can do: sign in to your most important accounts (email first) with a physical security key such as a YubiKey. A key only works on the real website, so a fake sign-in page gets nothing; nobody can sign in from far away without holding it; and it cannot be stolen by moving your number to another SIM, unlike text-message codes. Buy two and add both. In the window, each step with a web page has an Open this page button, and your answers are kept (in the program's own folder) until you finish or press Start over.
Apple, Google, WhatsApp and Meta warn people they believe were targeted by mercenary spyware or government-backed
attackers. More checks → I got a threat warning (or zero-breach-toolkit --threat-warning) says what to do,
in order: make sure the warning is real without clicking anything in it, do not erase the evidence, save a copy of
the phone and check it, then update and turn on Lockdown Mode or Advanced Protection, and get free help.
When a helpline or expert offers to look at your case, they give you an age public key (one line starting
with age1). "Send evidence to a helper" (start menu, "More checks", or the command below) puts the reports,
phone collection, screenshots or files you choose into one package that only that key can open:
zero-breach-toolkit --package-for-helper OUTFOLDER --helper-key age1... --add report.json --add phone-folder
age, rage or their usual
tools. An AndroidQF phone collection is kept exactly as AndroidQF wrote it, so their tools work on it unchanged.--verify-package package.zip.Keys that start with AGE-SECRET-KEY are secret and are refused. --no-encryption makes an unencrypted package,
only for a helper who asked for one.
Spyware has to start again after every restart, so it has to register somewhere. "What starts automatically"
(start menu, "More checks", or zero-breach-toolkit --startup) lists every one of those places in plain words:
Every program is fingerprinted and compared with the indicator lists. It marks as worth a look: unsigned programs
or scripts in folders any program you run can change, hidden (encoded) PowerShell, start-up commands that
download something, remote-access programs, hijacks, and entries that point to a missing program or were set up
with a path that can never run. Signed Windows components are hidden unless you add --startup-all. Nothing is
changed: it tells you where to switch something off.
Spyware has to send what it collects somewhere, so a recording of a phone's internet traffic can show it even when it hides on the phone. On Android, the free, open-source PCAPdroid app records without root: choose "PCAP file" as the output, use the phone normally for a day, then copy the file to the computer. Check it with "More checks" > "Check a network recording", "A phone's network recording" in the start menu, or:
zero-breach-toolkit --check-traffic phone.pcap
It reads .pcap and .pcapng files (PCAPdroid, Wireshark, tcpdump) and lists every server contacted: the names looked up, the names of encrypted connections (re-assembled across packets, as modern apps send them), plain web requests; HTTP/3 (QUIC) connections are matched by address only, because their names are encrypted and the toolkit never decrypts anything. PCAPdroid recordings name the app behind each connection, so a match says which app it was. Every name and address is compared with the spyware indicator lists, and the traffic is checked for contact at regular intervals like clockwork, dynamic-DNS names and encrypted connections on unusual ports. The recording is only read; nothing is contacted. A recording covers only the time it ran, and encrypted DNS hides look-ups.
--wifi-nearby lists the Wi-Fi networks this computer already hears and says what a hidden one probably is:
who made the device (the IEEE's public list of manufacturer codes is built in), whether it is part of the
router you are connected to (mesh systems and internet providers' routers run hidden networks for their own
units), whether it is a phone sharing its connection (a made-up address), and roughly how close it is. A hidden
network's name cannot be read without connecting to it, which the tool never does. Windows 11 asks for location
access before it shows nearby networks; macOS hides their hardware addresses, so less can be said there.
On Windows and Linux it can then find one hidden network: choose it and walk slowly around with the
computer - the signal is re-read every few seconds and the line says stronger, weaker or about the same. The
device is where the signal is strongest. In the terminal, type the network's number when asked; Enter or Ctrl+C
stops. --json PATH saves the result for the household report.
--trackers [MINUTES] listens for Bluetooth location trackers near you - AirTag and other Find My
items, Samsung SmartTag, Tile and Google Find Hub tags - and points out any that say they are away
from their owner and stay near you, which is what a tracker planted in a bag or car does. It only
receives. The double-click programs include the Bluetooth library it needs; with the Python version,
the tool offers to install it when you first run the check (one yes; the pinned bleak==1.1.1, ready-made
packages only) - or install it yourself with python -m pip install -r requirements-bluetooth.txt. On a Mac,
allow Bluetooth when asked.
Run it again after moving: a tracker heard in both places is the one travelling with you.
--combine REPORT [REPORT ...] puts the saved JSON reports of several checks on one page: each
computer, each phone (from the program or from the phone-check web page's "Save JSON"), a DNS log and
the home network check - and the smaller checks' saved results (hidden Wi-Fi, live connections, startup
items, network recordings, Windows' records, file, link, email and QR checks). One line per device, worst first, with what was found, what is worth a look
and what could not be checked - and a list of the kinds of check the house is still missing (no phone
checked, no home network check, no DNS log). Name a device with "Mum's iPhone=report.json"; reports
older than 30 days are flagged; a file that is not a report is listed, never silently dropped. Add
--html house.html for a page to print or keep. It reads files only and never replaces an existing
file.
On Windows and Mac, Apple's own app makes the backup. In the window, the phone screen's Make an iPhone backup... button opens Apple Devices or iTunes (Windows; the Microsoft Store if neither is installed) or Finder (Mac), shows the steps - including ticking "Encrypt local backup", which keeps far more of what the check needs - then watches the usual backup folders and offers Check this backup as soon as Apple's app has finished writing a new one.
Linux has no Apple app, so --make-iphone-backup FOLDER does it: after asking, it installs the
pymobiledevice3 backup helper (GPL-3.0-or-later; about 350 MB) into its own folder under
~/.local/share/zero-breach-toolkit/, with every file checked against the SHA-256 hashes in
requirements-iphone-backup.txt and nothing built from source. The
helper runs as a separate program, never inside the toolkit. It turns backup encryption on with a
password you type privately (handed to the helper on its standard input, never on a command line),
makes a full backup into FOLDER and the toolkit then checks it. It needs the usbmuxd service
(sudo apt install usbmuxd on Debian/Ubuntu). If encryption was already on, the backup keeps its
existing password and you are asked for that one to check it.
Apps with a built-in Chromium browser are found by their folder contents under AppData (Windows), Application Support (macOS) or the user and Flatpak configuration folders (Linux), including apps whose own folder is a Chromium profile, such as Signal on macOS. The search has no fixed depth limit; it is bounded by folder count and time, and reaching that bound is reported as a gap.
The tool reads a collection made with AndroidQF; it never talks to the phone itself. It checks:
It recognises the collection's own traces (USB debugging, the debugging shell's permissions) and does not report them as suspicious.
Local Finder, Apple Devices or iTunes backups (encrypted or not), extracted file systems and sysdiagnose archives. See Checking local iPhone evidence.
Installed configuration profiles are read for what they can do. A profile that manages the phone remotely (MDM), makes it trust a root certificate (which can be used to read encrypted web traffic), sends traffic through a VPN, proxy or another DNS server, or cannot be removed is listed as worth a look, with its name, issuer and install date. That is normal on a work or school phone and for a DNS filter you installed yourself; on a personal phone nobody else should have set one up.
Crash reports and diagnostic logs are also searched for traces of Cellebrite published by
the Citizen Lab: a process named mnm working on a task labelled com.cellebrite.bruteforce,
and, in an extracted file system, the identifiers of a Cellebrite computer in the phone's
records of computers it trusted. An ordinary backup does not contain these records, so a
backup alone cannot show whether the phone was accessed this way; a sysdiagnose archive or a
file-system extraction can.
About 13,300 published indicators from 29 downloadable sources and two built-in sets: Amnesty International's Security Lab,
the Mobile Verification Toolkit project,
the Citizen Lab and Echap's stalkerware research, and a hand-curated set from Citizen Lab
reports (Candiru / DevilsTongue and Paragon's Graphite, and Memento Labs' Dante from
Kaspersky) with every line cited. The curated
set works offline; --update downloads the rest from a fixed list of official sources.
The MVT project's own indicator files (Predator, QuaDream, Operation Triangulation, Candiru,
Cellebrite, DarkSword, Coruna and seven more; MIT licence) are also built in, so a computer that
never runs --update - offline, or where GitHub is blocked - still checks against them from the
first scan; a downloaded copy is used instead when there is one. --update also downloads a few
known-good lists (MISP warninglists: empty-file fingerprints, reserved
addresses, certificate-revocation and connectivity-check hosts ...): a published indicator that is
exactly one of those values can only be a mistake in the source, so it is set aside and counted,
never matched. Exact, so a listed provider such as duckdns.org never hides a real
something.duckdns.org. The lists published today contain no such mistake; this guards against
future ones.
A second built-in set holds about 1,040 file fingerprints and Android package names of
spyware used against journalists, activists and minorities (Arid Viper against Palestinians,
EvilBamboo, MOONSHINE, HenBox, DoNot, OceanLotus, KoSpy and others, and the Massistant
phone-extraction tool), copied from the indicator files and reports of ESET, Volexity, Cisco
Talos, Meta, Unit 42, Lookout and Amnesty International (and two package names from a
SentinelLabs report), every line cited. Fingerprints are SHA-256, or SHA-1 where a publisher
gives only that.
A few published phone traces that are not addresses or fingerprints (Cellebrite's, and the
Android settings and folder of Variston's Heliconia framework, published by Google) are
built into the phone checks, each with its source.
You need Python 3.8 or newer (python.org; on Windows,
tick "Add python.exe to PATH" when installing). No administrator rights and no extra
packages. On macOS and Linux type python3 instead of python.
git clone https://github.com/interplains/Zero-Breach-Toolkit.git
Zero-Breach-Toolkit, or Zero-Breach-Toolkit-main from a ZIP), click the address bar, type powershell and press
Enter. macOS: open Terminal, type cd (with a space), drag the folder into the window
and press Enter. Run every command below from this folder.python -X utf8 scan/zero-breach-toolkit.py --update
python -X utf8 scan/zero-breach-toolkit.py
On Windows you can instead double-click scan\run-scan.cmd. It saves the readable and
JSON reports in a findings folder next to the toolkit.Reports contain private details from your computer; keep them out of shared and synced folders. Useful options:
python -X utf8 scan/zero-breach-toolkit.py --quick # faster: skips file fingerprints
python -X utf8 scan/zero-breach-toolkit.py --phone "FOLDER" # a phone collection or backup
python -X utf8 scan/zero-breach-toolkit.py --json report.json # machine-readable report
python -X utf8 scan/zero-breach-toolkit.py --share-json summary.json # minimal summary for sharing
Put folder paths in quotes, especially if they contain spaces. On Linux or macOS,
sh scan/run-scan.sh takes the same options.
The project is anonymous, so do not take its word for anything. Verification rests on what you can reproduce.
Running from source, as above, means every line the tool executes is in the clone: nothing is compiled and nothing is fetched in order to run.
The single-file zero-breach-toolkit.py attached to a release is generated from the same
source. Rebuild it from the release's tag and compare:
git checkout v3.0.2
python build/bundle.py
python -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha256(open('dist/zero-breach-toolkit.py','rb').read()).hexdigest())"
For v3.0.2 the file is 7,879,062 bytes, SHA-256
0b6df5f02c6b13256b735bfb55c1ef0a31ff0c762550910be9f66b4f5090dafb. The size and SHA-256
published with each release are authoritative. The build is deterministic, so a matching
rebuild means the published file contains that source and nothing else. Releases are also
GPG-signed; see docs/VERIFYING.md.
The Windows program is being set up for signing through the SignPath Foundation, whose
certificate is issued to the Foundation rather than to a person, so the project stays
anonymous; see docs/CODE-SIGNING.md. Until that is in place the
program is unsigned. An .exe you build yourself with
PyInstaller is unsigned, has no download reputation and is not byte-reproducible, so
SmartScreen will warn, some antivirus products will flag it, and the comparison above does
not apply. Running from source avoids all of that.
On the phone, turn on Developer options (Settings → About phone → tap Build number seven times), then turn on USB debugging.
Connect the phone by USB and tap Allow when it asks about this computer.
Download and run AndroidQF on the computer. Answer its questions like this:
| AndroidQF asks | Answer |
|---|---|
| Take a backup of the device? | Only SMS |
| Download copies of all apps or only non-system ones? | Only non-system packages |
| Remove copies of apps signed with a trusted certificate? | No |
| Take the Intrusion Logs? | No, unless you turned on Intrusion Logging |
| Hash files on the device? | No (Yes also checks file fingerprints, but it is slow and can stop the collection on some phones) |
| Browser history / Magisk modules? | No |
On the phone, confirm the backup with Back up my data.
AndroidQF saves a .zip next to itself. Extract it.
From the toolkit folder, check the extracted folder (keep the quotes):
python -X utf8 scan/zero-breach-toolkit.py --phone "PATH TO THE EXTRACTED FOLDER"
Or run the tool with no options, choose A phone, and drag the folder into the window.
Turn USB debugging off again.
The collection holds private information about the phone. Keep it on your computer.
Use --phone-guide android for preparation steps and --phone FOLDER --preview to list
which artifacts are available. For an AES-encrypted backup.ab, add --backup-password;
the password is asked for privately at the terminal and never appears as an argument or in
a report. Age-encrypted acquisition archives must first be decrypted with the owner's
identity using the separate age tool; this scanner does not launch it.
Guided acquisition (experimental). --collect-android LOCAL_OUTPUT_FOLDER downloads
official AndroidQF v1.8.3, checks its pinned SHA-256, asks for the device owner's explicit
consent and runs the collector's interactive prompts. After a successful plaintext
acquisition it extracts the archive locally and checks the collection. Acquisition changes
phone state and saves private records; it is separate from read-only scanning.
This is the only point at which the tool runs a program it did not ship:
ADB_, ANDROID_ADB_, LD_ and DYLD_ variables removed and PATH reset to the
system directory, then deleted when the command finishes;The pinned digest verifies the publisher's release bytes; it is not an independent audit of the collector. The publisher ships the Windows build unsigned, so a browser download shows the usual "not commonly downloaded" warning and SmartScreen prompts on first run. If you prefer, install AndroidQF yourself, follow the five steps above and skip this command.
--age-recipient-file PATH supplies public age1 recipients (private identity files are
refused). When encryption is requested, a plaintext result is refused. An encrypted result
must have a supported age envelope and no unexpected extra files, but these format checks
cannot authenticate it or verify the recipient. It is saved for separate decryption; the
command succeeds without producing a scan or an all-clear. After a failure, check the
reported folder: original or partial records are kept and may be unencrypted.
Manifest.plist inside): on a Mac
~/Library/Application Support/MobileSync/Backup/, on Windows
%USERPROFILE%\Apple\MobileSync\Backup\.--backup-password if the backup
is not encrypted, and the password is asked for privately):python -X utf8 scan/zero-breach-toolkit.py --phone "PATH TO THE BACKUP FOLDER" --backup-password
--phone-guide ios and --phone-guide android print these steps in the terminal.
Encrypted backups need the optional cryptography package already installed in your Python
environment; nothing is installed automatically. Install it from the toolkit folder with the
same command you start the check with: python3 -m pip install --require-hashes -r requirements-backups.txt on a Mac or Linux, python -m pip ... on Windows (every package
pinned by version and hash). If the check still says it needs cryptography, it was installed
for a different Python on the same computer. The supported version is cryptography 50.0.2, which needs Python 3.9 or
later. Intel Macs get 48.0.1, the last release published for them; its remaining advisories
concern certificate checking, which this tool does not use.
For evidence you already have, use --phone ROOT --ios-input filesystem for an extracted
file system, or --phone PATH --ios-input sysdiagnose for a directory or TAR/TAR.GZ archive.
Both are also in the phone menu. This does not acquire a device.
It reads messages (SMS, iMessage, WhatsApp), Safari and other browsers, data-usage processes, app records, permissions, calls, calendar, interactions, Shortcuts, configuration profiles, analytics and diagnostics (shutdown logs, crash and memory reports, running processes, installation logs). Local browser visits are separated from synced or imported ones; unknown origin stays a reference with a gap. Unusual paths alone are leads.
Committed SQLite WAL records, including encrypted backup sidecars, are validated and
replayed on temporary copies. JSON findings keep source hashes and record locators. While a
table's row index is readable, an unreadable message, visit or process row is skipped and
later rows are still checked; repeated gaps are grouped. Unsupported encodings or schemas,
damaged WALs, record caps, unavailable protection classes and encrypted Manifest.db WALs
are gaps. The test suite covers the table layouts
of iOS 15, 16, 17 and 18. See docs/IPHONE.md for exact support and limits.
--scan-type default uses the computer checks and file candidates supported on your platform.--scan-type full also reads desktop-app raw web caches and hashes all file extensions
in the usual roots, including subdirectories normally skipped. It is broader, not a scan
of every drive, account or artifact. The 512 MiB file limit remains.--scan-type targeted --target PATH reads only the selected files, directories, drives
or browser profiles; repeat --target for several. Selected files are hashed whatever
their extension, within the same size and access limits. Copied Prefetch/Amcache files
inside the selection are also read. Live registry and log checks are outside this scope.--scan-type browser reads only this account's browser profiles and desktop apps with a
built-in Chromium browser (history, cookies, site storage, caches and connection records)
against every loaded list, including ad-campaign addresses. Large caches can take several
minutes. Files, startup entries, DNS, registry and system events are not read.--preview prints the proposed scope without scanning. File hashing reports progress.
Ctrl+C stops the scan and reports what was collected, with an incomplete-coverage gap.--extended-windows adds existing Sysmon and Security process events. It does not enable
logging or elevate privileges. If access is denied, a second run from an administrator
terminal can read what the ordinary account could not.On Windows, saved console and Explorer input is also read; it does not prove that anything
ran. Startup checks interpret recognisable batch commands, Internet Shortcut URLs and literal .lnk target and
argument metadata, without resolving or opening the target; anything they cannot interpret
is a gap. Related-record groups link the same indicator across artifacts with their dates
and original grades; they do not claim a causal attack sequence. Publisher validity,
platform and withdrawal labels are shown as context.
See the coverage table before relying on a particular check.
Running the tool in a terminal without choosing a check shows a menu. Enter starts the
standard check; 0 quits without scanning. The same menu offers a full check, a
browsers-only check, selected files or folders, or a phone collection. Scripts with
non-interactive input do not see it; --no-menu turns menus off.
The browsers entry also offers a test of whether your browser blocks ads. That test only works inside a browser, so the tool asks first and then opens the ArchiveGenocide test page in your default browser. The browser goes online for it; the tool does not. See PRIVACY.md.
After a menu-selected check you can inspect findings and references, review gaps and next
steps, save reports, or prepare a private evidence bundle. --post-menu offers the same
after a command-line scan. The report is shown before those choices. The Windows launcher
keeps prompts visible and saves both readable and JSON reports.
--report PATH saves the readable report, independently of --json and --share-json.
--export-blocklist PATH also saves the website names the check matched as a DNS block list:
a hosts file by default, or one name per line with --blocklist-format domains for Pi-hole,
AdGuard or NextDNS. It holds only what was found on this device, not the full indicator list.
References (a saved page about a name), IP addresses and names that may have changed owner are
left out, and the tool says how many.
Reports never replace an existing file inside a selected evidence folder, a selected input
file, or the app data and app cache folders where desktop apps keep the records the scan
reads. Choose a new filename. No baseline snapshots are kept.
--evidence-bundle PATH creates a new, unencrypted private ZIP with the full JSON
report, readable report, minimal sharing summary and an integrity manifest. Repeat
--evidence-file PATH to add original local files you choose. Report text never chooses
files to copy, and nothing is uploaded or sent to a helpline.
python scan/zero-breach-toolkit.py --scan-type targeted --target SUSPICIOUS_FILE --report report.txt --json report.json --evidence-bundle evidence.zip --evidence-file SUSPICIOUS_FILE
SUSPICIOUS_FILE is the path of one file; --evidence-file takes files, not folders.
The archive is previewed before it is created, never overwrites an existing file, and is limited to 128 originals of up to 64 MiB each and 256 MiB in total. It records SHA-256 hashes, tool version, scope, times and fingerprints of the indicator sets used. Hashes show later integrity, not authenticity to the original device. Originals are copied at export time and may differ from what was scanned; live databases may need their sidecar files selected too. Use the minimal summary for first contact, and share the full archive only through a secure route agreed with the recipient.
Trainers need a result to show, and real spyware cannot be used for that. --training
checks a made-up Android phone against made-up indicators, so people can learn to read a
report before they need to. It is also in the start menu as Practise with a training
example, and in the window as Practise, where the result carries an amber
TRAINING EXAMPLE bar.
python scan/zero-breach-toolkit.py --training spyware # findings and evidence grades
python scan/zero-breach-toolkit.py --training worth-a-look # leads, but no findings
python scan/zero-breach-toolkit.py --training clean # what "nothing found" means
python scan/zero-breach-toolkit.py --training cellebrite # a phone seized and unlocked with Cellebrite
The report is the ordinary report, so what people learn carries over to a real check. It
opens with TRAINING EXAMPLE - NOT A REAL CHECK and ends with notes for the trainer; the
JSON report has a training field and its first must_relay rule says it is an example.
--training..invalid ending, which can
never exist, and the family is named "Training example (not real spyware)".cellebrite example is the exception, because its point is to show the real result.
Its made-up phone log records one of the fake USB devices Cellebrite's unlocking hardware
imitates, which the ordinary phone check recognises by itself. The serial number and the
rest of the log are invented.The report starts with a short summary: what was found, what it means, what to do, and what could not be checked. The evidence follows.
The window always exits with 0 when it is closed, whatever it showed; for scripts and automation use the terminal commands, which return the exit codes below.
Exit codes for scripts:
| Code | Meaning |
|---|---|
0 |
no actionable matches and no recorded coverage gaps |
1 |
setup, argument or output error |
2 |
a match beyond a saved reference |
3 |
no actionable matches, but checks or indicator sources were incomplete |
4 |
the start menu was closed without scanning (no verdict or report) |
Reference-only matches stay visible and return 0 or 3, depending on gaps. No exit code
proves a device is safe.
The dist/ folder of this repository holds the project's own blocklist of the advertising
and tracking domains named in the indicators, in three formats: adfection.adblock.txt
(for ad blockers such as uBlock Origin), adfection.hosts.txt (a hosts file) and
adfection.dnsmasq.conf (for dnsmasq, many routers and Pi-hole style resolvers). Blocking is
a stopgap: it does not detect infection. The page
archivegenocide.com/scan has a test and setup steps for a
blocking DNS resolver.
--update downloads indicator sources, and also asks GitHub for the latest release number so
it can tell you when a newer version exists (--no-version-check turns that off; it never
happens during a scan). The separate --collect-android command downloads
a pinned official collector after consent. Ordinary scans stay offline. Full reports can
contain usernames, profile names, file paths, browsing details, SMS senders and message
excerpts; keep them private. --share-json summary.json writes counts, scope labels, the
verdict and fixed advice, and leaves out artifact text, indicator values and dates. It is an
initial summary, not forensic evidence; review it before sharing. See PRIVACY.md.
--describe prints, as JSON, every check the tool runs, what each reads and cannot see,
the exit codes and the rules for relaying a result. --json writes a machine-readable
report that marks the fields to relay to the person, the next steps that may be given, and
which fields hold untrusted text from the scanned machine. See
scan/CONTRACT.md.
A skill file is included for assistants that support
skills: add the skills/zero-breach-toolkit folder to the assistant's skill directory, or
have it read that file. It covers scope selection, encrypted-backup prompts, offline
operation, report interpretation and evidence privacy. Nothing is installed automatically.
Windows, macOS, Linux, Android (AndroidQF collections) and iPhone (local backups). See docs/COVERAGE.md for what each check reads and its limits. Built-in readers share one registry for platform selection, coverage descriptions and the single-file build; see scan/READERS.md to add one.
There is no src folder; the code is under scan/:
scan/zero-breach-toolkit.py: the entry point you run.scan/zbtriage/: the scanner (indicator loading, the network block,
reporting). The package keeps the project's earlier name so existing installs keep working.scan/zbtriage/modules/: one file per check (browsers, Windows
records, macOS and Linux, Android, iPhone, file fingerprints).scan/tests/: the test suite.build/bundle.py: builds the single file attached to each release from
this source (see Verify what you run).Indicators are the work of Amnesty International's Security Lab, the Citizen Lab, the MVT project and Echap.
Code, including the generated scanner: Apache License 2.0 (LICENSE). The curated
indicator files in iocs/ and generated indicator exports in dist/: CC0 1.0, public
domain (iocs/LICENSE.md). Optional bundled research rules keep their own
licences in third_party/candiru. Built-in copies of the MVT
project's indicator files (MIT), and data taken from LOLRMM and LOLDrivers (Apache License 2.0),
keep their notices in NOTICE and third_party/. Indicator and known-good lists downloaded
by --update remain under their publishers' terms and are not part of this repository.